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SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS TO A CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT OF 1940 FOLLOWING
EXXON MOBIL V. ALLAPATTAH
RENEE LABUZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The devastating decline in the investment of individual stocks
following the Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom scandals has pushed
more investors into the mutual fund industry, an area that has
been relatively free from scandal.' This is due in large part to the
core fiduciary principles set forth in the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (ICA). However, these fiduciary principles have come
under recent attack with court decisions overturning decades of
precedent providing for shareholder rights of action, including
those for breach of fiduciary duty under § 36(a) of the ICA.3
" Juris Doctor Candidate May 2007, The John Marshall Law
School. The
author would like to thank Professor Molly Lien for her inspiration in writing
this comment. The author would also like to thank her family and friends for
their support throughout the past three years.
1. See MATTHEW P. FINK, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, ICI
PRESIDENT'S REPORT AT THE ICI GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING, (2003)
http://www.ici.org/statements/remarks/03_gmm-finkspch.html (stating that
in 2002 an investor's chance of choosing a stock that would lose at least sixty
percent of its value was one out of five, while the chance of choosing a mutual
fund that would lose the same value was one out of 807); see also Editorial,
Wall Street's Chaperone, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2003 at A16 ("[It no longer
makes sense for most clients to dabble in individual stocks. The war is over.
The mutual fund industry won.").
2. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2005)
(setting out various provisions for breach of fiduciary duty between
shareholders and investment companies).
3. DH2 Inc. v. Athanassiades, 359 F. Supp. 2d 708, 714-15 (N.D. Ill. 2005);
Dull v. Arch, No. 05-140, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 27,
2005); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also
Dorchester Investors v. Peak Int'l Ltd., 134 F. Supp 2d 569, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding no private right of action under ICA § 34(b)); Olmsted v. Pruco
Life Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 283 F.3d 429, 432-34 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
no private cause of action exists under either § 26 or § 27 of the ICA). See
generally Arthur Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in FiduciaryRelationships,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 134 (2004) (discussing fiduciary duties as they relate to
financial firms, including the duty of loyalty and the duty to disclose material
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Part II of this paper will discuss the legislative history of
the ICA, precedent involving private rights of action, and a recent
court decision that stands in direct contradiction to both. Part III
of this paper will explore the importance of legislative history in
the statutory interpretation of the ICA and the impact of
precluding shareholders' private rights of action. Lastly, Part IV
of this paper will propose that courts consider extrinsic evidence,
such as longstanding precedent and unambiguous legislative
intent, even when statutory language appears clear on its face.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Development of the ICA

The ICA was enacted to counter widespread abuses that had
become apparent in the investment company industry, to preserve
the role of investment companies in capital formation, and to
assure investor protection.' Evidence of abuse in the industry was
evident after a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report
found that between 1929 and 1936, shareholders lost
approximately forty percent of their investments.5 To address this
issue, Congress commissioned the Investment Trust Study,' which
found that investment companies often benefited their affiliates'
and sponsors' interests rather than the interests of their clients.!
These benefits were the result of improper transactions, such as

information bearing on a client's decision in assessing securities options).
4. Paul Roye, S.E.C., Remarks before the American Bar Association: The
Exciting World of Investment Company Regulation (June 14, 2001), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news.speech/spch500.htm; see also S. REP. No. 1775
(1940) (stating that new legislation was proposed because the previous
legislation enacted by the SEC in 1933 and 1934 was insufficient "to eliminate
abuses and deficiencies which exist in investment companies" and also
because many investment companies did not fall within the scope of the
previous legislation); H.R. REP. No. 2639, (1940) (finding that legislation is
needed to stop the malpractices that exist in the investment company
industry).
5. Roye, supra note 4 (asserting that the loss of investments was due to
the investment companies' ability to attract "small unsophisticated investors,"
allowing them to mislead investors on the true nature of their investment).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (2005) (directing the SEC to make a study of the
activities and functions of investment companies, their corporate structures,
the investment policies of the companies, and the influence exerted by those
affiliated with the managements of the companies on their own investment
policies).
7. Roye, supra note 4 (finding that because investment companies were
structured in a way that kept them under the control of their sponsors, who
owned enough shares to have senior voting rights, the funds were controlled to
their benefit, and because fund assets were highly liquid in nature, they were
often easily embezzled by affiliated financial firms who used the assets for
their own private capital).
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embezzlement, occurring in large part because of the fund
sponsors' abandonment of fiduciary obligations to investors.'
B. Significance of the ICA Today
The ICA is an important piece of legislation that regulates
one of the most popular ways individuals invest their money:
through the purchase of mutual funds.9 Today, approximately
53.9 million U.S. households own mutual funds, amounting to
forty-eight percent of all U.S. households and almost ninety two
million individuals."
By the end of 2004, shareholders had
invested in more than 8000 mutual funds, totaling more than $8.1
trillion invested.'1 This far exceeds the amount of money that is
deposited at, and the total financial assets of, all U.S. commercial
banks."
C. Interpretationof § 36(a) of the ICA
1. The Statutory Language and Legislative History of§ 36(a) of
the ICA
The plain language of § 36(a) of the ICA authorizes the SEC
to bring a civil action against officers or directors for breach of
fiduciary duty to shareholders when personal misconduct is
involved. 3 On its face, this section does not provide shareholders
8. Id. See generally Thomas Frongillo, Christine Chung & Najwa Nabti,
Late Trading of Mutual Funds: Chinks in the Armor of the Regulators' Claim
that it is Illegal Per Se, ANDREWs WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REPORTER, July 29,
2004, at 5 (discussing abuses that presently occur in the investment company
industry).
9. J. Kevin McCall, Avidan J. Stern & James L. Thompson, Private
Litigation Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, in ILLINOIS INSTITUTE
FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: SECURITIES 2003 4-5 (2003); see also

FINK, supra note 1 (stating that mutual funds are the primary way in which
middle-Americans choose to make long-term investments in today's economy);
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (2005)

[hereinafter ICI FACTBOOK] (finding that mutual funds represent ninety-five
percent of total investment company assets).
10. ICI FACTBOOK, supra note 9, at 29-30 (comparing households today to
the six percent of U.S. households that owned mutual funds just twenty-five
years ago).
11. Id. at 59.
12. Roye, supra note 4 (stating that in 2001 mutual funds had over seventrillion dollars in assets compared to three-trillion dollars deposited in banks
and the six-trillion dollars constituting the total assets of the commercial

banks).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2005) states:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States... alleging that a person serving or acting in
one or more of the following capacities has engaged... in any act of
practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct in respect to any registered investment company for which
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with a private right of action. 4 A study of the entire ICA reveals
that only one section of the Act, § 36(b), provides for a private right
of action. 5 That section was amended in 1970 to allow a private
cause of action by a security holder .16
However, courts have often implied private rights of action
under many sections of the ICA, most notably under §36(a), "which
plaintiffs have used as a catch-all provision covering any alleged
breach of fiduciary duty." 7 For example, in In re Nuveen Fund
Litigation,8 the United States District Court for the Northern

such person so serves or acts- (1) as officer, director, member of any
advisory board, investment advisor, or depositor; or (2) as principal
underwriter ....
14. Id.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64. See also McCall, supra note 9, at 4-32
(stating that only § 36(b) of the ICA "expressly provides for a private right of
action for damages"). See generally id. at 4-18 (finding that the basis of the
1970 Amendments to the ICA was the Wharton Study, which found that
existing remedies for improper compensation of advisors did not properly
protect mutual fund investors).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) reads:
[Tihe investment advisor... shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty
with respect to receipt of compensation for services or of payments of a
material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the
security holders thereof, to such investment advisor .... An action may
be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security
holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such
company, against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of
such investment adviser.., for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of
such compensation or payment made by such registered investment
company or by security holders.
See also S. REP. No. 91-184, at 6 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4897, 4902 (stating that the need exists to amend the ICA to curb abuses of
investment advisers in compensations that are received from fund investors).
17. Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (S.D. Tex
1998); In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, No. 94 C 360, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8071, at *37 (N.D. Ill 1996); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F.
Supp. 1105, 1114 (D.R.I. 1990); Brown, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 222; General Time
Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 400, 401-02 (D.N.Y
1968); Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y 1963); Cogan v.
Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); McCall, supra note 9, at 4-32
to -38 (citing Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 417 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also
A.E. Korpela & L.I. Reiser, Annotation, Shareholders' Suits Against
Investment Companies, 30 A.L.R.3D 1088 (stating that a preponderance of case
law supports the proposition that shareholders have a private right of action
against investment companies for violations of the Investment Company Act).
See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Duty of Investment Adviser and
Interested Directors of Mutual Fund, Under § 36 of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, with Respect to Recapture of Portfolio Brokerage Commissions, 47
A.L.R. FED. 607 (discussing fiduciary duties imposed on advisers and directors
of investment companies).
18. In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, No. 94 C 360, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8071, at *25 (N.D. Ill 1996) (denying defendant's motion claiming that the
shareholders did not have a private right of action under § 34(b) based on false

2006]

Investment Company Act of 1940 Following Exxon Mobil

1525

District of Illinois found that while the defendant in this particular
case had not breached a fiduciary duty, a private right of action
The court stated that the
did indeed exist under § 36(a). 9
"decisive question is whether Congress intended to provide such a
private right of action in enacting the statute."'0 The court went
on to state that congressional intent is to be inferred from the
language and structure of the statute, the statute's legislative
history, and through an examination of whether the private right
of action is consistent with the statute's underlying scheme."
As noted above, § 36(a) does not explicitly provide for a
private right of action." However, most courts have looked to the
statutory structure of the ICA as justification for interpreting this
section as implying a private right of action."8 For example, the
industry abuse that was found to exist in the SEC study noted
above and that Congress sought to prevent in enacting the ICA
was enumerated in § 1(b) of the Act. 24 This section, entitled
"policy," states that the "interests of investors" are adversely
affected when investors purchase securities without accurate
information concerning the policies and financial responsibility of
the companies. 5 More importantly, the last paragraph of this
section provides that the Act should be interpreted to mitigate or
and misleading statements).
19. See id. at *17 (upholding the lower court's decision, not because a
private right of action did not exist under § 36(a), but because the directors did
not "aid and abet" conduct prohibited by that section of the Act).
20. Id. at *12 (citing West Allis Mem'l Hosp. Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251,
255 (7th Cir. 1988)); see id. at *11 (finding that the failure of Congress to
expressly provide for a private remedy does not mean that implying one is
inconsistent with an intent to make that remedy available).
21. See id. at *12 (stating that the language of the Act directs courts to
interpret provisions, and the legislative history arising from the amendments
indicates that the courts should imply a private right of action (citing Spicer v.
Chicago Bd. Of Options Exchange, Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 1992))).

22. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a).
23. See Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 872 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that
when statutory construct is silent and a private remedy is recognized by the
courts, the question is whether Congress intended to preserve the right of
action); see also Bancroft Convertible Fund, Inc. v. Zico Inv. Holdings, Inc., 825
F.2d 731, 734 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[Iun determining whether a private cause of
action may be implied from a federal regulatory statute, the starting point is
congressional intent[").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1; see also McCall, supra note 9, at 4-15 (stating that
courts have interpreted the ICA as intended to "remedy certain abusive
practices in the management of investment companies" and that the practices
Congress sought to specifically target were those discussed in the SEC study
and listed expressly as congressional policy in § 1(b) of the Act (citing Option
Advisory Service, Inc. v. SEC, 668 F.2d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 1981))).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b). Section 1(b) identifies various ways in which the
public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected, based on
facts disclosed from the reports the SEC made pursuant to the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935. Id.
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eliminate conditions in the Act that adversely affect investors'
interests2.
Courts have also looked to the legislative history of
subsequent amendments to the ICA as justification for
interpreting the section as implying a private right of action. In
1970, Congress amended the ICA to add § 36(b), which seeks to
reduce the risk of the adviser self-dealing that was predominant in
the investment industry at the time.' The amendment provided a
private right of action for security holders under § 36(b), the only
section of the ICA to do So. While some courts have held that by
enacting § 36(b), Congress showed that "when [it] wished to
provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so
expressly,"' others have implied a private right of action in § 36(a)
based on the corresponding Senate Report, which explained that
the language of § 36(b) "should not be read by implication to affect"
the implying of a private right of action under § 36(a).31
In 1980, Congress amended the ICA to provide that the Act's
provisions would apply to business development companies in
In doing so, the House
addition to investment companies. 2
Committee stated that it "wishe[d] to make plain that it expect[ed]
the court to imply private rights of action under this legislation."33
26. Id. Specifically, Section l(b) provides:
It is hereby declared that the policy and purposes of this title, in
accordance with which the provision of this title shall be interpreted, are
to mitigate, and, so far as feasible, to eliminate the conditions
enumerated in this section which adversely affect the national public
interest and the interest of investors.
Id.
27. In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8071, at *14;
Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b); see Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d
738, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that Congress amended the ICA with § 36(b),
a section that created "a narrow federal remedy" for breach of fiduciary duty
that stretches beyond common law breach of fiduciary duties).
29. 15 U.S.C. §80a-35(b).
30. Olmstead v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 283 F.3d 429, 433 (2d
Cir. 2002) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington Trustee, 442 U.S. 560, 573
(U.S. 1979)); Dull v. Arch, No. 05-140, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *7
(N.D. Ill. July 27, 2005).
31. S. REP. No. 91-894 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4960; see also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Surely
the last thing the SEC intended [by proposing § 36(b)] was the abolition of
implied causes of action which the courts had recognized under other sections
of the ICA, as the SEC had consistently.... ."); Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 863
(stating that the Senate went out of its way to "head off any potential
expressio unius argument" by explaining that the enactment of § 36(b) should
have no effect on the courts' current practice of implying a private right of
action under § 36(a)).
32. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
33. H.R. REP. No. 96-1341 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,
4811. The House Committee further commented: "[W]ith respect to business
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The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the
issue of whether there is a private right of action under the ICA.34
However, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, the Court did find that no private cause of action existed
under § 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, even
though decades of precedent found otherwise.35 In spite of Central
Bank, many courts have continued to imply private rights of action
under the ICA.36
On two occasions, the Supreme Court has assumed that
private rights of action exist under the ICA.37 In Kamen v. Kemper
Financial Services, Inc., the Court found that an individual
shareholder could bring an action under § 20 of the ICA.38
Although the Court did not mention the fact that this section does
not expressly provide a private right of action, it held that the
purpose of a derivative action was to give shareholders a means to
protect themselves from the malfeasance of the "faithless directors
and managers."39 In Burks v. Lasker,"' the Court again noted that,
development companies, the Committee contemplates suits by shareholders as
well as by the Commission, since these are the persons the provision is
designed to protect, and such private rights of action will assist in carrying out
the remedial purposes of Section 36." Id.; see also Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at
863 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1341 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4800, 4811); In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8071 at *15
(same).
34. McCall, supra note 9, at 4-32.
35. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 190 (1994); see McCall, supra note 9, at 4-35-37 (stating that, following
the decision in Central Bank, some courts decided to no longer imply private
rights of action under the ICA, while other courts distinguished the case). See
generally Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by
Section 10(b) and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud
and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 667, 667 (2004) (discussing the
impact of CentralBank on aiding-and-abetting liability under § 10(b)).
36. Young, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 925, 930; Seidel v. Lee, 954 F. Supp. 810, 818
(D. Del 1996); Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund Inc. v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 792-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Nuveen Fund Litigation,
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8071 at *9-16; Blatt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (D.N.J. 1996); Langer v. Brown, 913 F.
Supp. 260, 267-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); McCall, supra note 9, at 4-37 (citing
McLachlan v. Simon, 31 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).
37. McCall, supra note 9, at 4-32.
38. Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991)
(providing that, while the SEC has urged the Supreme Court to provide for a
private right of action, the Court has never addressed the question and
refused to address the issue in this case, as neither party litigated that
particular question before the Court of Appeals (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 534 (1970)).
39. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a):
It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce ...to solicit or to permit the use
of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of
any security of which a registered investment company is the issuer in
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although no private cause of action existed expressly, one would be
assumed under § 13(a) because the lower courts had so assumed
based on precedent.4 '
2.

The Reinterpretationof PrivateRights ofAction Under the ICA

With no express decision from the highest court and
division amongst the lower courts as to whether a private right of
action exists under the ICA, the Supreme Court decided a case
that subsequently changed the way the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
interprets the ICA.42 In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services,
Inc.,' the Court interpreted 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367, the statute that
governs supplemental jurisdiction. There, the Court held that the
statutory language was clear on its face and, therefore, the Court
could not use extrinsic authority to aid in interpretation." In
Exxon Mobil, the Court concluded that legislative history is itself
often ambiguous.
Moreover, legislative materials, such as
committee reports, often give unelected staffers and lobbyists the
incentive to manipulate legislative history when they are unable
to achieve a result through the statutory text.45
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
40. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 474 (1979) (discussing § 13(a)(3) of
the ICA).
41. Id. at 475 (citing Brown, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 222-28, Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (Cal. 1977), and Bolger v. Laventhol, 381 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
42. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 863; see also Individually-Brought
Investment Company Act Claims Against Mutual Fund Managers Dismissed,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION REPORTER, Aug. 15, 2005, at 12 [hereinafter

Individual Claims Dismissed] (stating that the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois dismissed state and federal claims that had been
brought by individual shareholders against directors and advisors because the
ICA provided no private right of action).
43. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
In Exxon Mobil the Court addressed the question of whether § 1367, a statute
the Court ruled is unambiguous on face but has legislative history that may
speak to a different interpretation, authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over
other plaintiffs who have been joined in the same case or controversy when
only one plaintiff has satisfied the amount in controversy requirement. Id. at
2625.
44. Id. at 2626 (holding that the "authoritative statement is the statutory
text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material" and that
extrinsic materials aid in interpretation to "shed a reliable light" on Congress's
understanding of ambiguous terms).
45. Id. (stating that judicial investigation of legislative history often
becomes "an exercise in 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.'
and that judicial reliance on legislative materials is not subject to the
requirements of Article I and is often the subject of strategic manipulations
when staffers and lobbyists are unable to achieve their goal through the
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Starting in 2004, many class action suits were filed on behalf
of shareholders alleging improper use of fund assets to pay
excessive commissions to brokers who would then favor a
particular fund in their sales efforts. 6 In one such case, Jacobs v.
Bremner, the plaintiff-shareholders alleged that the defendants
did not ensure their funds participated in the class action
settlements they were eligible for, thereby providing an
opportunity for the Northern District of Illinois to examine private
rights of action under § 36(a).47
The court in Jacobs held that dismissal of the plaintiffs'
action under § 36(a) was required following the Supreme Court's
decision in Exxon Mobil.' The Jacobs court held that Exxon Mobil
made clear that affirmative statements of Congress's specific
intent are "impotent in the face of unambiguous statutory
language. " " Since the plain statutory language of § 36(a) provides
a right of action for the SEC alone, no room was left for the court

statutory text (citing Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214
(1983))); see also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 362
(2005) (stating that textualists often worry that "'clues provided by the
legislative history are bound to be false" and that legislative history allows
staffers and legislators to "salt" the record with misleading statements
(quoting Antonin Scalia, Commentaries Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23

(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997))).
46. See FDIC Proposes Revisions to Annual Independent Audit and
Reporting Requirements; Federal District Court Dismisses Mutual Fund
Shareholder Suit Alleging Improper Revenue Sharing, MONDAQ, Aug. 10,
2005, at 2 (stating that the lawsuits all alleged breach of fiduciary obligations
under § 36(a)); see also Kim Koopersmith, et. al., Recent Lawsuits Against
Mutual Funds, Investment Advisors and Related Parties, METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, March 2005, at 16 (highlighting recent class action
lawsuits filed against mutual funds).
47. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (discussing breach of fiduciary duty as it
relates to both § 36(a) and § 36(b) and finding that plaintiffs "garden variety"
claims are not encompassed by either provision, regardless of the issue of
standing under § 36(a)).
48. See id. at 864-65 (finding the defendants' reliance on Central Bank and
Alexander was misplaced, as those two cases stood for the proposition that
clear statutory language must be followed in the face of silence, while § 36(a)
contained specific language calling for such action); see also Individual Claims
Dismissed, supra note 42, at 12 (asserting that the Act expressly gives the
SEC a right of action and "leaves no room for implication of a private right of
action").
49. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 865 (stating that Exxon addressed the same
issue at play here, namely, the conflict between unambiguous statutory
language and an unambiguous statement of congressional intent in
determining whether § 1367(a) confers jurisdiction to the courts in class action
suits where some, but not all, of the members of the class meet the amount in
controversy requirement).
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to imply that such an action exists. 50 The Jacobs court held that,
following Exxon Mobil, it could no longer use legislative history
and statutory structure to justify interpreting § 36(a) as implying
a private right of action, as other courts had done.5 The court
concluded that restraint had to be exercised "even though creating
a private right of action might create a good fit with the policy
2
goals of the statute.""
The reinterpretation by the Jacobs court highlights the
conflict that has persisted in statutory interpretation: the struggle
between textualists, who seek to enforce the objective meaning of
the text, and intentionalists, who seek to enforce the subjective
meaning of those who wrote the text.' Without an express ruling
from the Supreme Court on whether the ICA provides for a private
right of action, and with the seventh circuit's refusal to decide this
issue,' the long-term effect of Exxon Mobil and Jacobs remains
unclear.

III. ANALYSIS
The first portion of this section will compare the strength of
the legislative history and the interpretation of statutory
ambiguity in Exxon Mobil and Jacobs. The second portion will
discuss the effect of Jacobs on investors and the SEC, along with
examining the role of the SEC in private rights litigation. The last
portion of this section will consider the strength of investor claims
under state fiduciary principles.

50. Id. at 866.
51. See id. at 863-65 (stating that courts typically relied on the
congressional hearing reports from the 1970 and 1980 amendments in order to
justify a private right of action).

52. Id. at 864; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (listing the policy goals of
Congress in enacting the ICA based on a congressional study of abuses that
were prevalent in the investment company industry).
53. Nelson, supra note 45, at 347. The author asserts that all statutory
interpreters seek the meaning the legislature intends and that the conflict
between textualism and intentionalism boils down to differences between
methodology and normative tendencies, meaning that legislative intent is
important to textualists, though it uses a more rule-based approach in

applying it to statutory construction). Id. at 415-17. See generally Brian D.
Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?: A

Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 163, 183-90 (discussing the
various differences between judges that approach statutory construction from
both intentionalist and textualist perspectives).
54. Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 715 (7th Cir. 1997); see also McCall,
supra note 9, at 4-34 (noting that Boland was the Seventh Circuit's first
attempt at questioning private rights of action under the ICA, though the
Court did not rule on the issue).
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A. A Comparisonof Jacobs to Exxon Mobil
The Jacobs case, in relying on Exxon Mobil, seems to be
consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions that "appear
increasingly sympathetic to a strong presumption against private
remedies." 5 Even so, the judgment in Exxon Mobil was reached by
a slim five-to-four majority.' Since the court in Jacobs relied so
heavily on Exxon Mobil to arrive at its holding, it is necessary to
analyze the court's dependence on that case.57
1.

The Strength of Legislative History

Exxon Mobil and Jacobs differ in the strength of the
legislative history that supports the respective statutes in
question. In Exxon Mobil, the Court stated that even if it were to
agree that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is ambiguous,58 the
legislative history would not alter its view as to the best
understanding of that statute. 9
This was because the
corresponding House Report could be read to adopt one
interpretation of § 1367 and a Subcommittee Working Paper, on
which the statute was based, could reflect an opposite
understanding."
On the other hand, the legislative history
supporting § 36(a) of the ICA, as discussed in the previous section,

55. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of PrivateEnforcement: The
Case for Expandingthe Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 148
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)); see also Central Bank
of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994) (holding that express statutory authority prevails and rejecting the idea
that the Court could look to congressional intent to protect investors);
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (refusing to imply a
right of action and stating that the Court has retreated from its willingness to
imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided for one expressly).
56. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. 2611. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia,
Souter, and Thomas joined in the opinion of the Court in Exxon Mobil, while
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Stevens dissented in this case. Id.
57. See Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (holding that dismissal of the private
claim was warranted following the decision in Exxon Mobil).

58. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2619-20. § 1367 reads:
[Iun any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.
59. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2625. The Court found that the better
interpretation of § 1367 is that when a complaint contains at least one claim

that satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims within the same case or
controversy. Id. at 2620. The Court did not adopt the interpretation of the
statute that would require each claim to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement. Id.
60. Id. at 2627 (observing that attempts to figure out which authority is
more reflective of the legislators' understanding is a "hopeless task").
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contains "specific and affirmative statements of intent" calling for
private rights of action under the Act.6'
In deciding both Exxon Mobil and Jacobs, the courts took a
textualist approach in deemphasizing legislative history."
Although textualists place a great deal of emphasis on the express
language of the statute, they seem to have the same goal as
intentionalists: to understand legislative intent.' Even textualists
admit that there certainly could be individual instances where
judges who consulted legislative history would be better suited to
capture the meaning intended by the legislature than those who
disregarded it.'
The question, therefore, seems to be whether
judges should categorically presume legislative history is useful or
whether judges should consult extrinsic materials on a case-bycase basis to try and reach more accurate assessments of a
statute's intended meaning.'
However, under recent Supreme
Court decisions, the issue of legislative history does not even come
into play unless a court first finds that the statute in question is
ambiguous.'
2.

The Threshold Question of Ambiguity

One apparent effect of the court's decision in Jacobs is to
ignore Congress's specific intent as shown through legislative
history. In Jacobs, the court stated that legislative history has no
place in statutory interpretation where the statute is not
"ambiguous." 7 The word "ambiguous," however, is subject to
61. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 864; see supra note 31.
62. Nelson, supra note 45, at 362-63 (finding that textualists are famous for
ignoring legislative history when others would invoke it for a variety of
reasons, including the fear of activist judges, time constraint, and the idea
that people outside of the legislature are not sophisticated enough to advance
legislative intent).
63. Id. at 347-48 (arguing that textualists are given a bad wrap for their
downplay of legislative history, even though they too are seeking to interpret
the statute as it was intended by legislators).
64. Id. at 363; see also Stephenson, supra note 55, at 102-03 (asserting that
some of the most important private rights of action that are judicially implied
based on congressional intent are those that have been recognized under
securities regulation and investor protection laws).
65. Nelson, supra note 45, at 362-63 (noting the textualist belief that, in the
aggregate, the judiciary's efforts to uncover a statute's intended meaning will
be no less accurate than if they simply presume members of Congress were
using words in a conventional sense, while the intentionalists believe that, in
certain instances, looking at legislative history provides a common sense
approach to statutory interpretation).
66. See Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2626 ("Extrinsic materials have a role in
statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the
enacting legislatures understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.").
67. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 865; see also Stephenson, supra note 55, at
166 (finding a recent shift in judicial preferences in that deference is now
accorded to extrinsic material only when there is a statutory ambiguity).
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various interpretations among different judges.' In Exxon Mobil,
Justice Stevens dissented, stating that, "[blecause ambiguity is in
the eye of the beholder, I remain convinced that it is unwise to
treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of
whether legislative history is consulted."6 9 He went on to reason
that judges should make "themselves accountable to all reliable
evidence of legislative intent." °
However, courts generally do not differ in their
understanding of § 36(a) of the ICA: it explicitly grants authority
only to the SEC to bring a cause of action.71 That said, courts have
split in deciding whether the statute is ambiguous for two reasons:
(1) because § 1 states that conditions in the Act that adversely
affect investors' interests should be mitigated or eliminated, and
(2) because § 36(b) is the only one of the Act's sixty-four sections to
expressly provide for a private right of action, an oddity at best. 2
Determining whether a statute is ambiguous becomes
difficult when a statute "provides a clear private remedy under one
provision, but the structure of the statute makes it unclear
whether that remedy also applies to a separate but related
substantive provision in the same statute."2 Some courts have
implied a private right of action under § 36(a), finding it
ambiguous in light of § 36(b), which provides a private remedy.74
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has looked beyond
the precise language of a statute and has instead looked at the
"broader context of the statute as a whole" in order to determine
whether the language is ambiguous." Therefore, whether the
courts' use of the word "ambiguous" is relative to the statute as a
68. Exxon Mobil, 125 S.Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court erred in finding that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was not
ambiguous).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65-66 (2004)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). Indeed while in recent years the Court has
suggested looking into legislative history only to resolve textual ambiguities,
.common sense is often more reliable than rote repetition of canons of
statutory construction." Koon, 543 U.S. at 65-66.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). See generally McCall, supra note 9, at 4-32
(stating that while courts differ in permitting private actions under § 36, they
are in agreement on the express grant of power to the SEC).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1, § 80a-35(b); see McCall, supra note 9, at 4-35

(confirming that the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeal have recognized implied private rights of action under the ICA (citing

Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 871-74 (1st Cir. 1988); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533
F.2d 731, 745 (2d Cir. 1975); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir.
1968); Brown v. Eastern States Corp., 181 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1950)).
73. Stephenson, supra note 55, at 167 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89).
74. McCall, supra note 9, at 4-36.
75. Matthew J. Cleveland, Title VII and Negative Job References:
Employees Find Safe Harbor in Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 521, 535 (1998).
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whole or to a specific section of the Act is determinative
as to
6
whether they should delve into its legislative history.1
B. The Impact of Jacobs on Investors and the SEC
1.

Civil ClaimantsMust Settle For CriminalProsecution

Yet another impact of the ruling in Jacobs, one that investors
will clearly feel, is the inability to bring a civil claim for damages
or injunctive relief." Every year, private investors file a large
number of cases seeking to hold investment companies liable for
money damages resulting from breaches of duties in their
handling of securities."8 Now, since the SEC is authorized to bring
only criminal actions, investors will have almost no private
recourse under the ICA. The number of actions private investors
file far outweighs the number of cases the SEC brings before the
court, often because private parties are in a better position than a
public agency to uncover violations of law.79
2.

The SEC's Support ForImplied Private Rights ofAction

The ICA places the SEC in the position of having to enforce
an incredibly complicated statute, and its general answer to most
actions by investment companies is "no, you can't do that. " ' The
SEC has also been granted exemptive authority, which requires
that the SEC issue new rules and orders and find new approaches
in response to changed circumstances in the investment company
industry.81 However, this has been a burdensome task for the
SEC. Former Chairman Harvey Pitt stated, "I will not regale you
with the statistics on the length of time requests for exemptive
76. Stephenson, supra note 55, at 166-67 ("[The meta-question as to
whether a statutory provision is 'ambiguous' is as much a matter of subjective
interpretation as the underlying question of what the provision means.").
77. Individual Claims Dismissed,supra note 42, at 12.
78. Koopersmith et al, supra note 46, at 16 (noting that, in the course of a
few weeks, thirty-nine private class action lawsuits were filed against
investment companies alleging breaches of duty).
79. See David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through
Amicus Participation:The SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1174-75
(finding that in 1961, the year the SEC actively began promoting private
rights of action under the ICA, the SEC filed less than one hundred cases and

by 1988 this number had increased to only two hundred; in contrast, the
number of actions filed by investors in the same period increased almost
fifteen fold); Stephenson, supra note 55, at 108 (asserting that affected private
citizens are better able to not only monitor compliance, but weigh the costs
and benefits associated with bringing an enforcement action).

80. Harvey L. Pitt, S.E.C., Chairman, Remarks before the Investment
Company Institute, 2002 General Membership Meeting (May 24, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch562.htm.
81. See id. (stating that the SEC's use of its exemptive power has always
been to protect the needs of investors).
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relief wait in the queue
before being addressed. But, the number
82
is incredibly high."
As a result, the SEC has long supported private rights of
action in federal securities litigation, including the ICA, finding
that it supplements its own enforcement program and further
deters misconduct."
The SEC argues that to the extent that
private rights are curtailed, "further demands will be [placed] on
the Commission's already stretched resources."'
During fiscal
year 2004, the SEC received over 70,000 complaints, solely from
investors.85
The Supreme Court has also remarked on the importance of
implying private rights of action to supplement SEC action,
finding that civil damages and injunctive relief provide effective
weapons in enforcement of federal regulations.8" This is especially
true, the Court noted, in light of the number of cases the SEC
must review and the time limitations that accompany review of
each case.87
3.

The SEC's Role in PrivateSecurities Litigation
The SEC supports private rights of action through its
participation as amicus.'
However, as a result of the SEC's
82. Id.
83. See Giovanni P. Prezioso, S.E.C., General Counsel, Remarks Before the
American Bar Association Section of Business Law, General Counsel Forum
(June 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch060304gpp.
htm (stating that the SEC argued for implied rights of action under the ICA in
Brown v. Bullock and Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc.). See generally Brown v.
Bullock 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that a private right of action
exists under the Act for a director's breach of fiduciary duties); Brouk v.
Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 918 (8th Cir. 1961) (finding that no
private right of action existed under the ICA for plaintiffs seeking money
damages against officers).
84. Arthur Levitt, S.E.C., Chairman, Final Thoughts on Litigation Reform
(Jan. 23, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1996/spch070.txt. See generally Stephenson, supra note 55, at 107 (stating
that because the budget and manpower of federal regulatory agencies is
limited, they simply lack the power to enforce laws properly, but when
individual citizens are able to act as attorneys and bring private claims
government enforcement efforts are complemented).
85. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 66 (2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/new/

data/htm.
86. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (holding that a
private right of action exists under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
because it is the federal courts' duty to "adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief' when there is no specific grant of private right, and when
it is necessary to achieve the statute's chief purpose of to protecting investors).
87. Id. at 432.
88. See id. (stating that because the stakes in litigation under private
rights of action are often in the millions and billions of dollars, courts tend to
read the SEC's briefs very carefully and afford them a great deal of weight).
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limited resources, it has focused its efforts on participating
exclusively in cases dealing with federal securities laws at the
Supreme Court level.9 This means that cases such as Jacobs will
not appear on the SEC's radar until they reach the appellate level,
at the very earliest.
While implying private rights of action under the ICA allows
for enforcement of the Act that the SEC might not otherwise
address, the SEC's role in private securities litigation must also be
questioned. Through the filing of amicus briefs, the SEC has had a
significant impact in shaping the development of securities laws,
as its "brilliant win/loss record demonstrates." 90 It has often been
met with deference from the courts, which are aware of the SEC's
practical expertise and the need for flexibility in dealing with
changed circumstances."
However, in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel
the Court observed that, "there are limits, grounded in the
language, purpose, and history of a particular statute, on how far
an agency may properly go in its interpretive role."" Although the
SEC may have better information than the legislature and the
courts, scholars have stated that this does not necessarily mean
they should be given broad authority over the scope of potential
private rights of action.93 Thus, while it is clear that the SEC
supports private rights of action under the ICA, since it can not
alone prosecute every violation under the Act, it is also clear that
issues arise as to the level of deference an agency should be
afforded when it argues that private rights of action be implied.
C. Common Law Fiduciary Claims ProvideLittle Relief to
Investors
Yet another effect of the Jacobs court ruling is that in states
such as Illinois, where dealers in securities owe common law
fiduciary duties to their customers,94 some investors may look to
See generally Ruder, supra note 79, at 1170-80 (discussing the SEC's historical
role as amicus and the effect of its current amicus program on the courts).
89. Ruder, supra note 79, at 1170-80.
90. Prezioso, supra note 83. The SEC has filed amicus briefs in "every
substantive area of the securities law that can be enforced through private
litigation" and, on balance, the courts have often formally acknowledged that
they are adopting the SEC's position. Id.
91. Ruder, supra note 79, at 1181 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levison, 485 U.S.
224, 239 n.16 (1988)).
92. Id. at 1182 (citing Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 566 & n.20 (1979)).
93. Stephenson, supra note 55, at 129 (arguing that because agencies are

often closely involved in not only statutory enforcement but also in politics,
they may not always be aligned with the social interests of investors).
94. Brady v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., No. 04-2518, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

19853, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2004) (citing T-Bill Option Club v. Brown & Co.
Securities Corp., No. 92-2737, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11976 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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this cause of action for relief. For example, in Brady v. Allstate
Life Insurance Co., the plaintiffs argued breach of fiduciary duty
under both § 36 of the ICA and common law, when Allstate failed
to move funds between accounts according to investors' wishes.95
The court ruled that, while the plaintiffs did not plead facts
sufficient to state a claim under the § 36 personal misconduct
standard,' they did have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under common law theory.97 The court warned, however, that the
scope of the duty owed by Allstate was "exceedingly narrow,
'consisting at most of a duty to properly carry out transactions
ordered by the customer.'9.
The scope of the fiduciary duty, then, under state common law
principles and under the ICA, differs." The majority of state
corporation codes allow a corporation to limit or even eliminate the
liability of its directors and officers for breach of state law
fiduciary duties."°
While under common law principles, the
fiduciary duty is a narrow one, § 36(a) of the ICA is used by
plaintiffs as a "catch-all provision covering any alleged breach of
fiduciary duty."1"'
In enacting the ICA, and in subsequently
amending the Act, Congress made clear that breaches of fiduciary
duty existed for which no other mechanism was in place to
counter.'°2
The impact of Jacobs is far reaching and includes: a disregard
of the ICA's clear legislative history; the inability of investors to
bring civil actions under the ICA; the inability to find relief under
95. Brady, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19853 at *9.
96. Id. at *7-8 (finding that Allstate's actions, instituting company transfer
restrictions, did not rise to the level of personal misconduct under § 36, since

that section pertains to gross neglect of responsibilities and actions that
involve self-dealing).
97. Id. at *8.
98. Id. at *8-9.
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (providing that a breach of fiduciary duty
action involving personal misconduct may be filed against "any registered

investment company for which such person so serves or acts

-

(1) as officer,

director, member of any advisory board, investment adviser, or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end
company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company"); Index
Futures Group, Inc. v. Ross, 199 Ill. App. 3d 468, 475-76 (stating that
customers are owed merely a narrow duty of care in connection with the
performance of the functions ordered by the customer, such as taking orders,
executing trades, and dealing with customer funds).
100. Koopersmith et al., supra note 46, at 3. The author states that many
corporations invoke the protection state corporation codes provide by including
exculpatory charter provisions in their articles of incorporation. Id. Moreover,
state breach of fiduciary claims are not always viable claims, as there are

often no uniform standards of care in the mutual fund industry. Id.
101. McCall, supra note 9, at 4-32.
102. H.R. REP. No. 96-1341 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,

4811.
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state actions for breach; and the placement of the burdensome
task of holding investment companies liable on the shoulders of
the already over-burdened SEC.
IV. PROPOSAL
While the use of legislative history in Exxon Mobil would not
have changed that Court's ruling,"° the opposite result would have
been posited in Jacobs with the use of the ICA's legislative
Since the legislative history of § 1367 is ambiguous, 0 5 it
history.'
could not aid the Court in its interpretation of that statute.
However, in Jacobs, the court agreed that the statute's legislative
history was unambiguous and explicitly called for a private right
Both of these courts refused to consider legislative
of action."
history because they reasoned that the statute in question was
clear on its face. ' The Jacobs court, therefore, overlooked a key
tool in understanding the legislature's intent, which is, after all,
the goal of statutory interpretation according to both textualists
and intentionalists. 1°8
The approach the Supreme Court has adopted leaves a pitfall:
a complete disregard of clear legislative history that calls for a
court to rule one way, yet ruling another way because the statute
in question appears unambiguous - a determination that is often

103. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2625 (holding that § 1367 by its plain text
"authorize[s] supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties
arising out of the same Article III case or controversy").
104. See Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 864 ("[Rlestraint must be exercised even
though creating a private right of action might create a good fit with the policy
goals of the statute.").
105. Exxon Mobil, 125 S.Ct. at 2625.
106. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 863. The court recognized that the
legislative history of the ICA contained affirmative statements of specific
intent, acknowledging a 1980 House Committee report that stated:
The Committee wishes to make plain that it expects the courts to imply
private rights of action under this legislation, where the plaintiff falls
within the class of persons protected by the statutory provision in
question. Such a right would be consistent with and further Congress'
intent in enacting this provision, and where such actions would not
improperly occupy an area traditionally the concern of state law.
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-1341, at 28-29 (1980), as reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 4811.
107. Exxon Mobil, 125 S.Ct. at 2625; Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 866.
108. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 347 (stating that although textualists and
intentionalists have the same goals, their methodology is different: textualists
seek the objective meaning of the text, while intentionalists try to enforce the
subjective intent of the legislature); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (discussing the Supreme Court's
"unflinching[] proclam[ation] that 'legislative intent' is the touchstone of
federal statutory interpretation").
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itself subjective.' °9 In order to deal with the problems of applying a
categorical rule against the use of legislative history when a
statute appears clear on its face, courts should instead adopt a
common-sense approach.
When overruling decades of precedent that have implied a
private right of action, courts should rely not only on the statutory
text, but also on the legislative history when that history is clear,
as it is here. Looking to legislative history not only when it
contains explicit language, but also when there is longstanding
precedent" ° recognizing such legislative history provides a balance
that should ease the worries of textualists.
Textualists often argue that a straightforward reading of the
statute is required to hold the legislature accountable for the
statute it has passed.'
This certainly seems to be the case in
Exxon Mobil."' However, accountability is difficult to attain."
The public's one-time involvement in pushing the legislature to
pass the ICA makes it less likely that the legislature will be aware
of, and respond effectively to, the defect in the law."'
This,
therefore, undermines the textualists' claim that a formal
approach to statutory interpretation will "promote more artful
drafting.""' It is important to remember that the ICA was adopted
following a period when investors had lost over forty percent of
their investments."' Without a modern day catalyst, the ICA will
likely remain unchanged and investors will suffer the
consequences while the industry remains unchecked.
Justice Scalia has proposed the rule that courts should not
read federal statutes to establish private rights of action by
109. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2628-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting), see also
Stephenson, supra note 55, at 166 ("[Whether a statutory provision is
'ambiguous' is just as much a matter of subjective interpretation as the
underlying question of what the provision means.").
110. See Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 417; Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 2
F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (S.D. Tex 1998); In re Nuveen FundLitigation, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8071, at *37; Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp.
1105, 1114 (D.R.I. 1990); Brown, 194 F. Supp. at 222; Entel v. Guilden, 223 F.
Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y 1963); Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907, 909
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 400, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y 1968). These cases establish over forty years of
precedent for implying a private right of action under the ICA.
111. Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2748, 2753 (2005).
112. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2624. The Court noted that while a statutory
omission may seem odd, it is not always absurd, and therefore the Court held
that in the case of unintended drafting errors it is the duty of the legislators,
through congressional vote, to fix it. Id.
113. JudicialApproaches to Direct Democracy, supra note 111, at 2753.
114. See id. (discussing the relevance of direct democracy as it relates to both
statutory interpretation and judicial review).
115. Id.
116. Roye, supra note 4.
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implication." 7
He believes that members of Congress make
express provisions for these causes of action when they want to
create them."'
Textualist judges often interpret laws on the
assumption that legislators are aware of their contemporary legal
context and are aware of the effects the laws will have."9
However, in the case of the ICA, that assumption is misplaced.
The ICA was adopted during a time when Congress could have
reasonably expected that private rights of action be implied
"
freely. 20
At the time Congress passed the ICA, courts had a record
of implying private rights of action even when the statute did not
explicitly call for one.121
Textualists are skeptical of judges' abilities to distinguish
between which floor statements and committee reports should be
given credence."' They argue that judges are not in a position to
"separate the wheat from the chaff" and that a categorical
exclusion of legislative history may yield more accurate results in
statutory interpretation."3 However, the Supreme Court does not
seem to be arguing for a categorical exclusion of legislative
history."4 The Court stated that extrinsic materials can "shed
reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of
otherwise ambiguous terms.""5 This means that there are times
when the Court is perfectly comfortable with its capability of
interpreting legislative history.
Moreover, textualists argue that, through their interpretation
of legislative history, a statutory meaning may be superimposed
that Congress did not intend."6 However, a study of case law
shows that conservative members of the Rehnquist Court have
used strict canons of interpretation in contested cases to
undermine legislative preference."17 This means that canons have

117. Nelson, supra note 45, at 391.
118. Id.
119. See Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, supra note 111, at 2752
(arguing that such practices are dependent on both the expertise of the
lawmakers and their familiarity with the consequences of legislation).
120. Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 287-88 (2001)).
121. Id.
122. Nelson, supra note 45, at 377.
123. See id. (arguing for a strict rule-based approach to statutory
interpretation).
124. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2626.
125. Id.
126. See id. (arguing that legislative history is often "murky" and subject to
varying interpretations among the members of the judiciary).
127. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAN. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005) (reporting

that, as compared with the Burger Court, reliance on legislative history has
gone down twenty-percent during the Rehnquist Court, while the use of
statutory text has increased fifteen-percent). Brudney and Ditslear further
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been "regularly used
in an instrumental if not ideologically
128
conscious manner."

It seems, therefore, that many of the reasons textualists offer
for refusing to consult legislative history lose their credence,
Consulting unambiguous
especially as applied to the ICA.
legislative history, even when a statute appears clear on its face,
recognizes that legislatures have coherent and identifiable, but
sometimes unexpressed, policy intentions. 2 9
When interpreting § 36 of the ICA, courts have a variety of
tools at their disposal. The text of § 36, the text of the entire
the legislative
statute,' the legislature's policy preferences,'
history,"' and the administrative findings"n are all mechanisms

argue that in close cases there has been a substantive reliance on canons by
more conservative members of the court, which more liberal members of the
Court have countered by invoking the importance of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. Id. at 7.
128. Id. at 6. Some scholars argue that use of strict canons of statutory
interpretation serve the judiciary's more strategic interest. Id. at 9. As such,
the canons are used as a faqade, merely to support the courts' judicial policy
preferences. Id. at 10.
129. Manning, supra note 108, at 423-24. Intentionalists believe that
legislation should be treated just as the speech of an individual human actor is
treated: "unexpressed background intentions" can be used to clarify the
meaning that a reasonable person would attach to the chosen words. Id.
Textualists, however, believe that the only legislative intentions are those that
are expressed in the final text of the statute and, therefore, they do not believe
that Congress has a "collective will apart from the outcomes of the complex
legislative process" Id. at 424.
130. While § 36(a) may not appear ambiguous on its face, when it is
interpreted in light of the entire Act, including the policy provisions and the
amended § 36(b) which provides for a private right of action, it is more difficult
to argue that § 36, on its own, encompasses the legislative intent of the
enacting Congress. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b). That section states:
It is hereby declared that the policy and purposes of this title, in
accordance with which the provision of this title shall be interpreted, are
to mitigate, and, so far as feasible, to eliminate the conditions
enumerated in this section which adversely affect the national public
interest and the interest of investors.
132. S. REP. No. 91-184 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4902; H.R. REP. No. 96-1341 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,
4811.
133. See Ruder, supra note 79, at 1174-75 (stating that the SEC has been
actively promoting private rights of action under the ICA through the filing of
amicus briefs in cases that are at the appellate and Supreme Court level). See
generally Stephenson, supra note 55, at 107 (stating that because the SEC's
budget and manpower is over-stretched, it supports a regulating mechanism
that provides for the ability of individual citizens to act as attorneys and bring
private claims); Prezioso, supra note 83 (stating that the SEC has filed amicus
briefs in all areas of securities law that can be enforced through private
litigation and that the courts have often formally acknowledged adoption of
the SEC's position).
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available to the court.'3

In light of the lengthy judicial precedent
and the clear legislative history, courts should move past the text
in interpreting whether a private right of action exists under the
ICA. In doing so, the courts will enforce, rather than frustrate,
congressional intent.13
Nothing can be more clear than Congress explicitly stating
that it intends for there to be a private right of action under the
Act." 6 Overturning decades of precedent would frustrate this
congressional intent. Had Congress not intended there to be a
private right of action, it certainly would have amended the
statute to so state or would have argued such during one of the
Act's many floor discussions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the federal judiciary has been moving away from
relying on legislative history, a categorical rule against its
usefulness in statutory interpretation leaves much to be desired.
The ICA, with its explicit legislative history calling for a private
right of action and decades of precedent implying such a right, has
certainly fallen victim to the rigid rules applied my many courts..
Many of the textualists' reasons for these rigid rules are
speculative at best.
Therefore, courts should look past the text of the statute and
welcome the use of legislative history to aid in statutory
interpretation, especially when the court is exercising its right to
overturn longstanding precedent. In the case of the ICA, this is
the common-sense approach. Rather than ignoring a mechanism
that aids the courts in giving the statute the effect that was
intended, courts should embrace the aid, even if it means strict
rules of interpretation must succumb to a case-by-case analysis.

134. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 127, at 8.
135. Id.
136. S. REP. No. 91-184 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4902; H.R. REP. No. 96-1341 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,
4811.

